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Introduction to the Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis in 
Britain: Constructing and Contesting Competence 
 





It is almost always inadvisable to try to second-guess the character of a General 
Election campaign before it begins in earnest.  Yet, even in today’s shadow-boxing 
phase in advance of the British General Election due to be called in 2010, a number of 
important campaign contours are already in evidence.  It is one of the unwritten laws 
of British electoral politics that governments unravel – particularly those of a certain 
longevity – as events appear ever more to have spiralled out of their control.  The task 
for the Brown Government in the upcoming General Election campaign is to try to 
convince voters that there is still life left within Labour despite its current travails 
with the credit crunch and British banks’ self-imposed entrapment in the subprime 
crisis.  Claim and counter-claim are likely to pass between the Government and the 
opposition parties as to where the blame lies for the current disarray of the banking 
sector, whose model of regulation is most responsible and who is best placed to 
ensure a successful clean-up operation.  Whoever is perceived to have come out on 
top in this debate is likely to stand a very good chance of winning the election. 
 
At stake is the ability of each party to project itself as the most competent in matters 
of macroeconomic management.  Since the emergence of the distinctively New 
Labour phase of party politics in the mid-1990s, opinion poll data consistently 
showed that this matter was settled in the minds of voters in favour of Labour 
(Leggett 2005).  Indeed, writing just before the eruption of the subprime crisis, Helen 
Thompson (2008) noted that New Labour had so successfully captured the 
competence agenda that many of its MPs had increasingly lost sight of Gordon 
Brown’s role in forging that reputation; they mobilised instead behind alternative, 
purportedly more charismatic, candidates to succeed Tony Blair as Prime Minister.  
Brown’s self-styled ‘Iron Chancellor’ persona, coupled with almost constant 
reiteration of performance indicators revealing an unbroken period of growth under 
his Chancellorship, helped to seize public recognition for being the party most trusted 
on the economy from its traditional association with the Conservatives (Keegan 
2004).  Yet, this historical reversal has itself latterly been reversed as the fallout from 
the subprime crisis spreads more widely around the British economy.  Business 
failures, job losses, mortgage foreclosures and house repossessions mean the 
subprime crisis is already an integral feature of British electoral politics. 
 
Our concern in this special section, however, is not to invite our participants to reflect 
on which of the main political parties most plausibly can claim macroeconomic 
competence in current circumstances.  It is rather to ask them to fill in significant 
elements of the back-story which shapes the context in which the reputation for 
competence is today both claimed and challenged.  It is clear that the whole notion is 
inflected with particular assumptions about what constitutes right behaviour within 
modern economies and about what constitutes right regulation of economic 
behaviour.  One is thus struck with the intriguing possibility that each of the main 
political parties might approach voters in the upcoming General Election campaign 
with reform programmes in which competence is measured – somewhat oddly 
perhaps – by how swiftly they can recreate the generic socio-economic conditions out 
of which the subprime crisis arose in the first place.  Problem-solving regulatory 
changes might already be coming on-stream in order to elicit rather greater oversight 
of banks’ balance sheets and to guard against particularly egregious practices of credit 
creation.  Yet, how effective, for example, can we expect the Turner Report 
recommendations for redesigning bank regulation to be in reconstituting actual bank 
behaviour when public ownership of the banks has not been used to assert public 
control of basic banking functions (see Financial Services Authority 2009)?  The 
whole ideological structure of modern-day conceptions of macroeconomic 
competence is anathema to such control, which means that articulations of self-
proclaimed competence are merely likely to offer more of the same as a solution to 
ongoing difficulties.  The status quo ex ante thus looms large in current attempts at 
crisis resolution. 
 
From our perspective, by contrast, the subprime crisis is a manifestation of the 
escalating contradictions of an increasingly financialised global capitalism.  Such a 
model can only be reproduced if a leveraged structure of expanded debt obligations 
can be recycled through keeping asset bubbles afloat.  The very nature of asset 
bubbles, though, is that they are founded upon a combination of economic and 
psychological foundations which itself proves to be tension-prone.  Bubbles very 
rarely stay afloat beyond the short term.  One of the tasks of future contextual 
research on the subprime crisis in Britain might therefore be to show how the 
dominant articulation of macroeconomic competence has become so closely tied to a 
bubble economy.  The subprime crisis is something more endemic to the systemic 
logic of financialised capitalism than a merely temporary breakdown in an otherwise 
smooth allocation of credit.  In short, the whole credit function in the British economy 
has been distorted by the incentive structure emergent from the dominant conception 
of macroeconomic competence. 
 
Much of the early literature on the political economy of New Labour focused on its 
passivity in the face of the perceived need to demonstrate that it was worthy of 
eliciting the electorate’s trust in its plans for government (e.g., Gamble 1996; Driver 
and Martell 1998).  It emphasised the potential credibility of its programme in terms 
which were immediately recognisable as the endorsement of its Thatcherite 
inheritance (e.g., Heffernan 2001; Bauman 2007).  The assertion of competence can 
be politically defined to suit just about any coherent set of policy proposals, but New 
Labour chose not to redefine the core features of the prevailing economic settlement.  
Its understanding of competence therefore matched that of its Conservative 
predecessor.  To pass oneself off as credible in these terms meant to emphasise the 
benefits of light-touch regulation as a means of ensuring that credit creation took 
place within a structure of private property rights.  To make the case for controlling 
the content of banks’ decisions to activate credit flows was entirely antithetical to 
maintaining the impression of macroeconomic competence.  This is the impression 
that all parties will likely attempt to convey in the upcoming General Election, but it 
is itself a highly contestable aspect of the way in which the political economy of 
Thatcherism informed the governing programme of New Labour. 
 
In their own manner, the authors of each of the papers contained in this special section 
seek to probe possible areas of contestation in the structure of competence out of 
which the subprime crisis arose.  None do so directly, because this was not the theme 
of the workshop for which the initial drafts of the papers were first solicited.1  The 
workshop focused on the political economy of the response to the subprime crisis, 
envisaging that the response would itself tell us important things about the causes of 
the crisis.  We asked our participants to engage critically with the response currently 
enacted by the Brown Government so that they might help us to learn more about the 
understanding of ‘normal finance’ which is inscribed into the response.  In general, 
that understanding will lead to one of two basic explanations of the causes of the 
crisis.  Is the crisis merely the result of a temporary malfunctioning of an otherwise 
unproblematic credit system, as manifested in the anomalous allocation of credit to 
increasingly exotic mortgage products?  Or is the crisis evidence of something much 
more fundamental than that?  Is it an essential feature of a process of financialisation 
which strives for societal incorporation into its economic structure via the pricing 
trajectory of asset bubbles? 
 
The policy response which seeks the immediate restoration of ‘normal’ allocation 
functions in the former scenario serves only to reproduce the original problem in the 
latter.  There is much at issue, then, in beginning to unpack the nature of the bank 
bailouts undertaken by the Brown Government.  The bailouts reflect not only a 
particular understanding of what has gone wrong and how it can be put right, but also 
a particular commentary on the political interests which were embedded in the status 
quo ex ante and which will receive privileged treatment in any attempt to restore that 
status quo.  The headlines surrounding the bailouts have typically focused on the 
sheer volume of public money being made available to provide the banks with a route 
to renewed balance sheet health, as well as on the repercussions for future policy of 
paying back that debt.  But a rather different story emerges when the focus turns to 
the broader political vision which the bailouts serve to sustain and the political 
interests which are constitutive of that vision. 
 
The first three papers in the following collection address themselves explicitly to this 
issue.  In that respect, they also provide interesting accounts of the potential meaning 
of the competence which will be both asserted and denied in the upcoming General 
Election campaign.  (1) In his paper, Colin Crouch looks broadly at the governing 
strategy which has emerged from the eclipse of traditional forms of Keynesianism in 
Britain since the 1970s to conclude that this has amounted to ‘privatised 
Keynesianism’.  The subprime crisis places the sustainability of such a strategy in 
doubt, because it is based on individualised financial habits which can be maintained 
only in the presence of easy bank credit.  However, the banking sector distress which 
is the most obvious immediate effect of the subprime crisis has led to a significant 
tightening of credit and, as a result, to a greater political imperative for individuals to 
rein in their existing debt leverage. (2) Alan Finlayson takes a similar line on the link 
between the subprime crisis and potential fractures in the governing strategy currently 
underpinning the British economy, but he focuses his analysis at a different level.  
Whereas Crouch is interested in the broad macroeconomic dimension of that strategy, 
Finlayson concentrates instead on understanding how the macroeconomic imperatives 
filter down into the personal economic subjectivities of a newly financialised 
citizenry.  The housing market has recently provided the primary means of enabling 
the future welfare aspirations of asset-owning citizens to be fulfilled, but the pre-
credit crunch structure of house prices looks as though it will be a clear casualty of the 
subprime crisis.  (3) Matthew Watson works in between these two levels of analysis, 
showing that the politics of the bank bailouts might well serve to recreate Crouch’s 
privatised Keynesianism, but that they do so primarily through the articulation of a 
middle-class politics designed to protect existing wealth accumulated on the housing 
market.  Watson charts the way in which a middle-class moral panic of the 
‘responsible mortgage borrower’ has been used to justify the presentation of a 
politically contestable blank cheque of public money to help banks repair their 
balance sheets and reactivate the credit functions of privatised Keynesianism. 
 
The two papers with which the collection concludes focus on how this governing 
strategy – and its associated understanding of competence – impacts upon the 
management of the British economy.  (4) In their paper, Andrew Leyshon and Shaun 
French study one manifestation of the exigencies of a credit system in which 
allocation decisions impact pro-cyclically in order to reinforce dominant asset price 
trajectories.  They provide a genealogy of the rise and fall of the buy-to-let sector 
within the British housing market, conceptualising buy-to-let mortgage lending as a 
‘socio-technology of financialisation’ which exposes certain segments of a 
financialised citizenry to the full force of macroeconomic shocks.  The distribution of 
this exposure has a spatial component insofar as it particularly affects certain localised 
housing markets, but it also has a social component in terms of what strata of society 
it affects the most.  (5) Colin Hay shows how the creation of such spatial and social 
vulnerabilities was functional to the growth experience of the British economy under 
New Labour.  He consequently demonstrates that the macroeconomic dimension of 
the underlying governing strategy passes through the unequal financialisation of the 
citizenry.  This dynamic is itself built upon a core tension which has remained 
relatively uncontroversial during the period in which house prices surged ahead but is 
likely to become more central to political debates in the context of falling prices.  He 
suggests that the governing strategy has been based on a discursive bifurcation of 
different types of inflation as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, with the good applying to the 
housing market and the bad to consumer prices in general.  This has had the effect of 
moralising recent bubble dynamics in house prices, thus securing them against 






1 The workshop was held at the University of Warwick on 18/19 September 2008.  We gratefully 
acknowledge financial assistance from the host institution, the Economic and Social Research Council 
(project number RES-000-22-2198), GARNET – the EU Network of Excellence on Global 
Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation, and the Political Studies Association of the UK.  More 
information about the workshop appears at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/ipe/subprime/, including links to the recordings of all 
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